Israel if not the 1st country to recognize Somaliland as country Ethiopia did in 2024

 

Israel, Somaliland, and the “Who Recognized First?” Question—Why Ethiopia’s 2024 Move Still Changed Everything

1) The claim that became a headline: “Ethiopia recognized Somaliland in 2024”

Somaliland has operated as a de facto state since it declared independence from Somalia in 1991—maintaining its own elections, institutions, security forces, currency, and a relatively stable internal order compared with much of southern Somalia. Yet it remained unrecognized by UN member states for decades.

That’s why the January 1, 2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding (MoU) detonated like a diplomatic shockwave. The deal was widely reported as: Somaliland offers Ethiopia sea access / a coastal lease, and in return Ethiopia would move toward recognizing Somaliland (or “become the first country in Africa” to do so). AP News+3IISS+3Crisis Group+3

But here’s the crucial distinction:

• A pledge to recognize (or “consider recognition”) inside an MoU is not the same as formal recognition under international diplomatic practice.

• Formal recognition usually shows up in clear state acts: official recognition statements, diplomatic notes, establishment of diplomatic relations, embassy openings, exchange of ambassadors, UN notifications, treaty actions that presume statehood, etc.

In 2024, the strongest publicly documented reality is: Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an MoU, Somaliland said recognition was part of it, and Ethiopia’s move triggered regional backlash—but Ethiopia did not complete the formal act of recognition in a way that settled Somaliland’s status internationally. Crisis Group+2Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey+2

So when people say “Ethiopia recognized Somaliland in 2024,” they’re often compressing a more complicated reality:

Ethiopia’s MoU created the first credible pathway where a UN-member state might recognize Somaliland as part of a strategic bargain—even if the recognition never fully materialized then.

And that “almost-recognition” mattered enormously.

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2) Why Ethiopia’s 2024 MoU mattered even without formal recognition

Ethiopia is Africa’s second-most populous country and a major military and diplomatic actor in the Horn. It is also landlocked, a structural fact that shapes its strategic imagination. Ethiopia’s leadership has repeatedly argued that access to the sea is an “existential” economic and security issue.

Against that backdrop, the MoU did three things at once:

1. It put recognition on the negotiating table as currency—something Somaliland could “sell” for strategic value.

2. It challenged Somalia’s sovereignty claims—because Somalia insists Somaliland is not a separate state, and any deal treating it as one violates Somalia’s territorial integrity.

3. It raised the regional temperature—drawing in neighbors and external partners who fear Horn instability (and fear precedent-setting secession recognition).

International Crisis Group’s analysis framed the MoU as a major escalatory move with serious repercussions. Crisis Group
And the diplomatic blowback ultimately helped drive the region toward a Turkey-mediated off-ramp: the Ankara Declaration between Ethiopia and Somalia in December 2024, emphasizing sovereignty and de-escalation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey+2EEAS+2

So even if Ethiopia didn’t “recognize” in the final sense in 2024, it shifted the Overton window:

• It demonstrated Somaliland could strike high-level bargains as an actor, not merely a “region.”

• It proved sea access could reorder alliances.

• It showed recognition could be used as leverage in a multipolar Horn.

That is exactly the kind of diplomatic precedent that later recognitions often build upon.

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3) Israel’s 2025 recognition: a true “first” (and why it happened now)

On December 26, 2025, Israel announced it formally recognized Somaliland—and major outlets described it as the first country to do so. Reuters+2The Guardian+2

The reporting also stressed:

• Somalia condemned the move.

• Regional actors (including Egypt and others) voiced concern.

• Israel framed the step as aligned with broader regional diplomacy currents. Reuters+1

Why would Israel do it?

A realistic analysis points to overlapping incentives:

• Geostrategic location: Somaliland sits near the Gulf of Aden/Bab el-Mandeb corridor, a critical maritime chokepoint.

• Security calculus: proximity to Yemen’s conflict dynamics and broader Red Sea security concerns can make partnerships in that geography valuable.

• Diplomatic signaling: demonstrating it can create new partnerships beyond traditional arenas.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the decision, Israel’s formal recognition is the kind of act that can break a diplomatic dam—because once one UN-member state recognizes, others reassess the costs of following.

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4) The counterfactual you want: “What if Ethiopia had recognized Somaliland first in 2024?”

Let’s treat your scenario carefully:

Scenario A: Ethiopia formally recognizes Somaliland in early 2024

If Ethiopia had issued an unambiguous recognition in 2024, several second-order effects would likely have followed:

(1) Somalia–Ethiopia rupture becomes deeper and longer
Somalia’s opposition to the MoU was already intense. A formal recognition would likely have hardened the crisis into a prolonged diplomatic freeze and potentially affected security coordination. AP News+1

(2) AU and regional bodies face a precedent test
The African Union traditionally leans hard toward territorial integrity norms. A major AU member recognizing a secessionist entity would force a debate the AU generally wants to avoid.

(3) Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt react through their own security lenses
Even without naming every reaction, the bigger pattern is clear: a recognition would be read as a strategic earthquake affecting ports, trade routes, and alliances.

(4) Somaliland’s diplomatic trajectory accelerates
Somaliland could convert recognition into:

• more formal bilateral ties,

• better access to finance and investment narratives,

• stronger bargaining position with both Somalia and external partners.

But it could also trigger:

• harsher political counter-moves by Somalia,

• more “proxy competition” among regional actors,

• and higher risk that Somaliland becomes a frontline in others’ rivalries.

Scenario B: Ethiopia signals recognition but stops short (what we basically saw)

This is the “pressure without finality” path—still destabilizing, but allowing mediation and a negotiated de-escalation like the Ankara Declaration. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey+1

In this world:

• Somaliland gains leverage (“we can do state-like deals”),

• Ethiopia gains bargaining power (“we have alternatives for sea access”),

• and the international community retains space to push compromise.

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5) If Israel isn’t the first, what changes?

Your question asks: if Israel is not first because Ethiopia did it in 2024, what then?

The “first” matters for symbolism, but the deeper issue is who the first is—because different recognizers send different messages.

If Ethiopia were first:

• Recognition would be read as regional, not just “external.”

• It would look like the Horn of Africa is rewriting its own map from within.

• It could pressure neighbors directly and reshape trade/security alignment fast.

If Israel is first (what happened per reporting):

• Recognition is read as extra-regional intervention into a sensitive sovereignty dispute.

• It may invite “this is geopolitics” narratives more than “this is regional consensus.”

• It still breaks the recognition barrier, but it does so in a way that can polarize reactions.

Either way, the second recognizer becomes almost as important as the first, because it indicates whether recognition is a one-off or a trend.

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6) The real takeaway: Ethiopia’s 2024 move may have been the “first domino,” even if Israel was the first formal recognizer

History often separates:

• the first formal act, and

• the first move that made the formal act plausible.

Ethiopia’s MoU was arguably the first major move in years that made “recognition of Somaliland” feel like a live diplomatic option rather than a permanent taboo. Crisis Group+1

Then Israel’s 2025 recognition became the first formal breach of the wall. Reuters+1

That sequence—pressure, backlash, mediation, then external recognition—may shape what comes next.